GOVUVEIA v. GRULER

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of Guardianship of:

JOSEPH M. GRULER, An Adult.
_____________________________________________

MARIANNE GOUVEIA, et al., Petitioners/Appellees

v.

ROBERT GRULER, SR., Respondent/Appellant

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0402 PB
FILED 04-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB2005-000584
The Honorable Sarah Selzer, Judge, Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Dyer Bregman & Ferris, PLLC, Phoenix
By Scott R. Ferris, Scott C. Hodges
Co-Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees

Engelman Berger PC, Phoenix
By Matthew Klopp
Co-Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees

Spencer Fane LLP, Phoenix
By Alexandra LeClair, Norma C. Izzo
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
 GOUVEIA, et al. v. GRULER
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 The superior court entered an order approving visitation and
contact terms between Robert Gruler, Sr., (“Father”) and his adult son,
Joseph Gruler (“Joey”). Among other things, that order also retained
Marianne Gouveia (“Mother”) and Robert Gouveia (“Brother”)
(collectively, “the Co-guardians”) as co-guardians. Father appeals from that
order. For the following reasons, we vacate the visitation and contact
provisions, remand for reconsideration on those provisions and the
guardianship determination, and otherwise affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father are the parents of Joey and Brother. Joey is
under an adult guardianship. The parties’ relationship is highly
contentious. In March 2021, the parties agreed Mother and Brother would
serve as Joey’s co-guardians and agreed to a visitation schedule between
Joey and Father. In October 2022, the Co-guardians petitioned to decrease
Father’s visitation with Joey. In September 2023, Father counter-petitioned,
asking to serve as Joey’s sole guardian and receive increased “parenting
time” with Joey.

I. The Settlement Agreement

¶3 In November 2023, the parties and Joey’s court-appointed
attorney reached a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”)
purporting to resolve all pending issues.

¶4 The parties agreed to participate in a comprehensive family
evaluation conducted by a neutral, mutually approved evaluator (“the
Evaluator”). Among other things, the Settlement Agreement required the
Evaluator to recommend a visitation schedule between Joey and Father,
which the parties agreed to be bound by. The Settlement Agreement did
not require the Evaluator to recommend who should be Joey’s guardian.
The parties agreed their attorneys would “prepare a Stipulated Order for
the Court to enter that incorporates” the Evaluator’s recommendations

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Opinion of the Court

“without change.” Then, after considering those recommendations, the
court would determine who should be Joey’s guardian, with Mother and
Father agreeing they would not serve as co-guardians.

¶5 The court approved the Settlement Agreement in a signed
order and administratively closed the case. The parties jointly moved for
reconsideration, in part because the Settlement Agreement was contingent
on the court entering future orders on visitation and guardianship. The
court issued an updated order approving the settlement (the “Approval
Order”).

II. The evaluation and subsequent orders

¶6 In September 2024, the Evaluator issued a report
recommending a detailed visitation schedule that reduced Father’s time
with Joey. Father then moved under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 60(b)(4) (void judgments) and (6) (any other reason justifying
relief) to vacate the Settlement Agreement, and by implication the Approval
Order. Father argued the Settlement Agreement (1) improperly delegated
the court’s authority to determine what visitation schedule was in Joey’s
best interests to the Evaluator and (2) was against public policy. He argued
the court should conduct an evidentiary hearing on the recommendations.
The Co-guardians opposed that motion, and cross-moved for the court to
sign their proposed order containing the Evaluator’s recommendations per
the Settlement Agreement.

¶7 In an unsigned minute entry, the court denied Father’s
motion and granted the Co-guardians’ cross-motion. The court reasoned
that the Settlement Agreement did not impermissibly delegate the court’s
authority because it was a guardian’s responsibility to set a ward’s
day-to-day schedule. The court also concluded “that the Evaluator and the
parties are not asking the Court to modify the current co-guardianship
between Brother and Mother.” The court signed the Co-guardians’
proposed visitation order (the “Visitation Order”) three days later. The
order incorporated the Evaluator’s recommendations, including the contact
and visitation schedule, and maintained the Co-guardians’ status as Joey’s
guardians.

¶8 Father timely appealed the Visitation Order. We have
jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(9).

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Opinion of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶9 As an initial matter, the Co-guardians argue that Father’s
motion was untimely. Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) motions must be brought within
a reasonable time, which is within the superior court’s discretion to decide.
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c); see Brooks v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 173 Ariz.
66, 71 (App. 1992). Here, the superior court addressed the merits of Father’s
motion, indicating it found the motion was timely. The Co-guardians have
shown no abuse of discretion in that determination.

I. The Settlement Agreement is enforceable.

¶10 We review the Settlement Agreement’s enforceability de novo.
Robertson v. Alling, 237 Ariz. 345, 347, ¶ 8 (2015).

¶11 Father contends the superior court erred by denying his
motion and entering the Visitation Order. He argues the Settlement
Agreement is unenforceable because it impermissibly delegates judicial
authority to the Evaluator and is against public policy.

¶12 The Settlement Agreement is not an impermissible delegation
of judicial authority. By its terms, the Settlement Agreement binds only the
parties and does not purport to bind the court. The agreement required
counsel to submit a proposed order containing the recommendations to the
court, but the court was free to accept, reject, or modify any
recommendations inconsistent with Joey’s best interests.

¶13 Father’s public policy arguments also fail. It is not against
public policy for parties to agree in advance to be bound by future outcomes
of disputes, as Father argues. That is the nature of settlement agreements,
which Arizona has long favored over litigation. See Phillips v. Musgrave, 23
Ariz. 591, 594 (1922). And, contrary to Father’s argument, nowhere in the
Settlement Agreement did the parties agree the Evaluator’s future,
not-yet-completed recommendations would be in Joey’s best interests. We
see no public policy concern with the parties agreeing in advance that the
Settlement Agreement “is fair and reasonable and in their best interests.”
(emphasis added). The Settlement Agreement is enforceable.

II. The superior court did not deny Father due process.

¶14 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion and
denied him due process because (1) it did not hold an evidentiary hearing
on his visitation and guardianship petition and (2) it did not give him an
opportunity to depose the Evaluator. We review a court’s decision whether

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Opinion of the Court

to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 233–34, ¶ 19 (App. 2012).

¶15 By entering into the enforceable Settlement Agreement,
Father agreed to be bound by the Evaluator’s recommendations and to
present those recommendations, unchanged, to the court. Parties may
stipulate “to evidentiary matters such as the admission, exclusion or
withdrawal of evidence from consideration,” and are bound by that
stipulation unless relieved from it. Pulliam v. Pulliam, 139 Ariz. 343, 345
(App. 1984). In Pulliam, this Court upheld a similar agreement limiting the
parties’ evidence to a child custody report and prohibiting the preparer of
the report from being called as a witness. Id. at 346. By agreeing to be bound
by the Evaluator’s recommendations, Father waived the right to challenge
those recommendations through an evidentiary hearing or a deposition. See
In re MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318, 322, ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (the beneficiary
of a statute may waive its protections). The court did not abuse its
discretion, nor deny Father due process, by enforcing that stipulation.

¶16 Father has provided no other grounds for relief from this
agreement. He argues for the first time on appeal that the Evaluator broke
with her own protocols because she did not conduct interviews at both
parents’ homes. We do not address this contention because issues first
raised on appeal are deemed waived. Odom v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216
Ariz. 530, 535, ¶ 18 (App. 2007).

¶17 In the superior court, Father argued only that he disagreed
with the recommendations and had “concerns” about the “process,
findings, and conclusions” because Mother made unspecified false
statements. Even if this argument were properly before us, these vague
assertions would be insufficient to justify relief. Rule 60(b)—Father’s basis
for seeking relief—requires movants to show “facts which, if proven at trial,
would constitute a meritorious defense.” Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 243 Ariz. 531,
534, ¶ 12 (2018) (cleaned up). The showing “need not be strong,” but “must
be greater than mere speculation.” Id. at 535, ¶ 16 (cleaned up).

¶18 The superior court did not deny Father due process by
holding him to his stipulation and denying him an evidentiary hearing or a
chance to depose the Evaluator.

III. The superior court misinterpreted Section 14-5316 when it signed
the Visitation Order.

¶19 Father contends the court misinterpreted Section 14-5316
because it “rubber-stamped” the Evaluator’s recommended visitation

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schedule. We review the superior court’s interpretation of statutes de novo.
Matter of Conservatorship of Chalmers, __ Ariz. __, __, ¶ 12, 571 P.3d 885, 888
(2025). “Statutory interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of
the words the legislature chose to use. We do so . . . according to the plain
meaning of the words in their broader statutory context.” S. Ariz. Home
Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286, ¶ 31 (2023).

¶20 An amended version of Section 14-5316 took effect shortly
after Father filed his counterpetition for visitation and guardianship in
September 2023. See 2023 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 195, § 8 (1st Reg. Sess.). As
amended, Section 14-5316(G) replaces Section 14-5316(F) with no
substantive change. But Section 14-5316(D) was amended so that, when a
person with a significant relationship to the ward petitions for contact, it
becomes the guardian’s burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the requested contact will be detrimental to the ward’s health, safety,
or welfare. The timing of Father’s petition meant that, but for the Settlement
Agreement, he would have had the burden to establish his requested
contact was in Joey’s best interests. For our purposes here, we cite the
current version of the statute unless otherwise noted.

¶21 Section 14-5316 requires a guardian to allow contact between
the ward and persons who have a significant relationship to the ward, but
the guardian may limit that contact if he or she reasonably believes the
contact will be detrimental to the ward’s health, safety, or welfare. See
A.R.S. § 14-5316(A)-(B).

¶22 But when a guardian withholds contact, Subsection (D)
allows a person with a significant relationship to the ward to petition the
court for an order compelling the guardian to provide contact. When such
a petition is filed, “the court shall consider” several statutory factors in
determining “what, if any, contact between the [petitioner] and the ward is
in the ward’s best interest.” A.R.S. § 14-5316(G) (emphasis added).

¶23 By the plain language of Subsection (G), when a Subsection
(D) petition is filed, the court—not the guardian—must determine whether
the petitioner’s requested contact is in the ward’s best interests. And
because the petition must contain “the type and frequency of [the] contact
being requested,” A.R.S. § 14-5316(D), and the court must determine “what,
if any, contact . . . is in the ward’s best interests,” A.R.S. § 14-5316(G), we
conclude this duty also applies to petitions to modify contact, not just
petitions to allow contact.

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Opinion of the Court

¶24 Here, Father petitioned to modify his contact with Joey under
Subsection (D). See A.R.S. § 14-5101(15) (a blood relative is a person with a
significant relationship to the ward). The Settlement Agreement, which
binds both Father and the Co-guardians, required the parties to submit the
Evaluator’s recommended visitation schedule to the court for approval.
Because the parties requested the visitation schedule through a Subsection
(D) petition, the responsibility thus shifted to the court to independently
verify that the requested schedule was in Joey’s best interests under
Subsection (G) before approving it.

¶25 The Co-guardians argue we can presume the court
independently evaluated the proposed schedule because Section 14-5316
does not require the court to make written findings on each factor, and each
Subsection (G) factor was supported by the evaluation.

¶26 The Co-guardians are correct that the court need not make
written findings, compare with A.R.S. § 25-403(B) (courts “shall make specific
findings on the record about all relevant factors” implicating a child’s best
interests), but we cannot presume the court independently concluded the
requested visitation schedule was in Joey’s best interests under Section
14-5316(G) because the record demonstrates otherwise.

¶27 In the minute entry explaining why the Settlement
Agreement was not an impermissible delegation of judicial authority, the
court stated:

Under [Section] 14-5316, the court can intervene
to require (or prevent) a ward’s contact with
someone but does not manage the minutiae of a
ward’s time. The Settlement Agreement tracks
this model and acknowledges that the court
would need to approve any proposed changes
to who acts as guardian, but also acknowledges
that a guardian can determine a ward’s
day-to-day schedule without Court approval.

¶28 Guardians generally have the authority to coordinate a
ward’s time without court interference. Guardians have the same rights,
powers and duties over a ward that a parent has over a minor child,
including the responsibility to oversee a ward’s day-to-day activities. See
A.R.S. §§ 14-5312(A), -5316(A)–(C). But Subsection (D) petitions arise when
a petitioner asks the court to “compel” a guardian to provide the requested
contact with a ward. A.R.S. § 14-5316(D). Under such circumstances,

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Subsection (G) prohibits the court from simply deferring to the guardian’s
reasonable belief that the petitioner’s requested contact is or is not in the
ward’s best interests, as the superior court did here.

¶29 Because the court expressly stated that the Co-guardians
could approve the petitioned-for contact under Subsection (D) without
court approval, the record shows the court approved the requested contact
in deference to the Co-guardians’ authority, without independently
verifying whether the requested contact was in Joey’s best interests. This
was error. See DePasquale v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 333, 336 (App. 1995) (in
child custody, the court may not delegate a statutorily-mandated duty to
determine best interests to a third party); Alexander M. v. Abrams, 235 Ariz.
104, 108, ¶¶ 19–20 (2014) (same applies to juvenile dependency and
guardianship). The court thus erred by approving the proposed schedule
without independently evaluating it under the Subsection (G) best-interests
factors.

IV. The superior court erred by maintaining the Co-guardians’ status
as co-guardians without determining if the appointment was
supported by the recommendations.

¶30 Father also argues the superior court erred by maintaining
Joey’s current guardianship arrangement because its decision rested on
incorrect factual findings. We review a court’s guardianship order for abuse
of discretion. Matter of Guardianship of Kelly, 184 Ariz. 514, 518 (App. 1996).
A conclusion not supported by facts is an abuse of discretion. Matter of
Conservatorship of Fallers, 181 Ariz. 227, 230 (App. 1994).

¶31 The court found, incorrectly, “it appears that the Evaluator
and the parties are not asking the Court to modify the current
co-guardianship between [the Co-guardians].” But the parties explicitly
raised that precise question in their competing motions. The Settlement
Agreement was contingent on the court appointing a guardian and stated
that a guardianship recommendation was outside the scope of the
evaluation. And the parties expressly stated the need for the court to make
a future guardianship determination in their stipulated motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, the superior court abused its discretion by
not deciding, based on the recommendations, whether it was in Joey’s best
interests to modify his guardianship under Section 14-5307.

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Opinion of the Court

V. The superior court’s failure to comply with Rule 58 is not
reversible error.

¶32 Because we vacate the Visitation Order in part, we address
Father’s Rule 58 argument to the extent it impacts the remainder of the
order. We review the superior court’s interpretation of court rules de novo,
but we review its application of the rules for abuse of discretion. Clayton v.
Kenworthy, 250 Ariz. 65, 67, ¶ 8 (App. 2020).

¶33 Under Rule 58(a)(2)(A)(ii), “[a] judgment may not be entered
until 5 days after the proposed form of judgment is served, unless . . . the
court waives or shortens the 5-day notice requirement for good cause.”
Failure to comply with Rule 58’s five-day waiting period is not reversible
error unless prejudice results. Foster v. Ames, 5 Ariz. App. 1, 4 (1967).

¶34 The superior court signed the Visitation Order three days
after the Co-guardians lodged their proposed order. According to Father,
this was prejudicial error because he was denied an opportunity to raise
issues about the Evaluator’s recommendations.

¶35 Father failed to establish prejudice from the shortened
timeframe. The plain language of Rule 58 “contemplates its use as a means
to object to the form of judgment only, not its substance.” United Bank v.
Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 197 (App. 1990). Father challenges only the merits of
the Visitation Order, not its form. Because he could not raise these
substantive issues under Rule 58, the premature entry of judgment did not
prejudice Father.

VI. We decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

¶36 Father requests attorney fees on appeal under Section
14-5316(O)(2), arguing the Co-guardians unreasonably withheld contact
with Joey. The Co-guardians request fees on appeal under Section 12-349,
arguing Father’s appeal was unreasonable and intended to delay, harass,
and unnecessarily expand the proceedings.

¶37 At the time the parties filed their competing motions, Section
14-5316 (2017) did not include an attorney fee provision. The attorney fee
subsection was added shortly after Father filed his counterpetition. See 2023
Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 195, § 8 (1st Reg. Sess.). Even under the current version
of Section 14-5316(O), Father would not be entitled to a fee award because
there was no finding that the Co-guardians unreasonably withheld contact
with Joey. We also decline to award fees to the Co-guardians because

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Opinion of the Court

Father’s appeal is not unreasonable. Father is entitled to his taxable costs on
appeal under Section 12-341 upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶38 The Settlement Agreement is enforceable. We vacate the
visitation and contact provisions in the Visitation Order and remand for the
court to apply Subsection (G) to determine whether the parties’ proposed
visitation and contact schedule is in Joey’s best interests. We also remand
for the court to resolve the guardianship dispute in accordance with Section
14-5307 and the Settlement Agreement. We affirm the Visitation Order in
all other respects.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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